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TheVAT-CIT Substitution
1.1 ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES
Inthis bookinitial attempt is made to assess the pos-
sible first-round consequences of a major change in fiscal
structure: partial or complete replacement of the United
States corporate income tax by an indirect tax on value added. The
study has two primary dimensions and is intended to fulfill two
rather different functions. First, the value-added tax (VAT) has been
a recurrent focus of interest among those concerned with tax policy,
and discussion of the VAT has often been linked with the possibility
of a reduction in the corporate income tax (CIT). Thus, the partic-
ular aspects of fiscal change we examine warrant serious analysis in
their own right. However, the second and ultimately more important
objective is the development and adaptation of techniques of analysis
which are applicable to the evaluation of the impacts of large-scale
changes in fiscal structure on specific segments of the economy. It
has long been recognized that this type of analysis cannot be under-
taken within the confines of the easy ceteris paribus assumptions of
partial equilibrium economics. "All else" does not remain constant
when major changes in tax structure are undertaken. The identifi-
cation and meaningful evaluation of the full consequences of such
changes would require the use of a general equilibrium analysis, one
which would permit the explicit recognition of responses in various
sectors of the economy to changes in fiscal variables. While the need
for a general equilibrium approach to fiscal changes that are pervasive
in their impacts is recognized in contemporary public finance theory,
little progress has been made in applying this type of analysis to con-
crete policy situations. The present study is a partial step in this2 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
direction,limited in its scope and policy implications, in that the
possible macro-economic consequences flowing from the stimulus to
real investment involved in the reduction of the CIT are not taken
into account, the basis of comparison being in each case alternatives
that involve the maintenance of a constant budgetary deficit or sur-
plus, rather than attempting to work in terms of a constant aggre-
gate real demand.
The development of a general equilibrium framework for the
evaluation of major changes in fiscal structure was first set forth as
a focus for future NBER research by John Bossons and Carl S.
Shoup. In a 1969 report, they specifically proposed the VAT-CIT
substitution as a subject of priority concern [Bossons and Shoup]. A
number of factors contributed to the then-current interest in the
value-added tax as an alternative to direct corporate taxes. This
proposed change in tax structure had its origins in a general dis-
satisfaction with the existing system of taxation and in several
specific policy concerns which came to the fore in the early 1960s.
First, and probably most important, was the concern with economic
growth which had emerged as a major issue in the late 1950s. One
explanation offered for lagging rates of growth was the alleged de-
pressive effect of high marginal rates of income taxation on the rate
of investment. The corporate income tax became a particular target.
It was thought that elimination of the CIT would stimulate invest-
ment either through increased after-tax rates of return to capital or
through enhanced corporate liquidity(net-of-tax cash f'ow) or
some combination thereof. The VAT, on the other hand, at least
in its popular form as a consumption tax, would not involve any
offsetting, depressive effects on growth.
A related variant of the growth argument was concerned with
the adverse consequences of the corporate income tax for the com-
position, rather than the level, of investment. As a partial income
tax, not applying to noncorporate business income, the CIT insofar
as it was not allowed for in any way in the personal income tax
provisions regarding dividends and capital gains, created incentives
to redirect investment from the taxed corporate sector to the un-
taxed noncorporate sector. This allocative inefficiency was criticized
by economists: an equalization of net-of-tax rates of return in the
corporate and noncorporate sectors could be achieved only by higher
gross returns in the corporate sector and excessive investment in the
noncorporate sector. Elimination of the CIT would raise net-of-
tax returns in both sectors through a flow of capital from the unin-
corporated to the incorporated sector. However, the possibly more
serious charge was that the CIT, in discriminating against the
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corporatesector, in fact discriminated against those industries which
were most dynamic. If the corporate sector, for reasons of tech-
nology and organization, is the engine of productivity growth and
economic progress, then the adverse consequences of discriminatory
tax treatment are both static and dynamic. Within the corporate
sector, moreover, the CIT discriminates also against those invest-
ments in new and specialized plant and equipment that cannot
readily be made the basis for mortgage or debt finance (e.g., invest-
ment in railroad rolling stock could often be more easily financed
with debt than investment in yard automation). The rate of growth,
as well as the level of income and output, would be increased by a
movement toward greater fiscal neutrality.
The second major impetus for advocacy of the VAT was provided
by the recurrent balance-of-payments crises which have plagued the
United States from the mid-1960s through the early ]970s. The
deterioration in the United States trade position revived concern for
the effects of tax policy on the international competitive position
of the economy. In this context the apparent contrast between ex-
tensive reliance of the United States on origin-based direct taxes,
which are nonrebatable under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), and dominance abroad, particularly in Europe, of
indirect, destination-based taxes suggested the possibility of a tax
substitution, e.g., the VAT for the CIT, as an alternative to devalua-
tion as a means of correcting trade imbalances. Somewhat more
generally, the discussion of the evolving United States relationship
with Western Europe embraced the VAT because of its role in the
tax harmonization efforts of the European common Market.1 The con-
cern with international trade and economic integration leads back to
the issue of growth because of the benefits to the balance of pay-
ments of sustained increases in productivity. It is primarily with ref-
erence to these issues of growth, trade, and economic integration that
the Committee for Economic Development has advocated (a) an initial
partial substitution of a VAT for the CIT and (b) the confinement of
any future tax reductions to the remaining CIT rather than to any
newly adopted VAT [Committee for Economic Development, p. 28].
1. The role of the VAT for the Common Market countries was primarily one
of tax rationalization. In general, it was introduced as a replacement for other,
less desirable forms of indirect taxation, e.g., wholesale and retail sales taxes and
manufacturers' and turnover taxes. As will be discussed later, these prior taxes
were also generally applied on a destination basis, i.e., were rebated on exports
and applied as border taxes on imports, consistent with GATT regulations. Thus,
their replacement by the VAT should not have implied in itself a systematic
change in the terms of trade between the European Economic Community
(EEC) and other countries.4 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Inthe early 1970s, discussion of the VAT was stimulated by spec-
ulation that the Nixon administration would tie the value-added
tax to a proposal for federal assumption of major responsibility for
the financing of primary and secondary education and by the pro-
posed imposition of a United States VAT in the context of post-
August 1971 International monetary adjustments.
In addition to these topical sources of interest, the VAT has
attracted attention partially because of its seeming novelty. Only
recently enacted on a comprehensive basis by any developed, indus-
trial nations, the VAT differs sufficiently in administration from
other closely related forms of indirect taxation, e.g., the retail sales
tax, as to appear to be a new, potentially far-reaching fiscal instru-
ment.2 Thus, government officials and legislators, particularly at
the federal level, view it as a major untapped source of stable rev-
enues.
Economists have been attracted to the VAT because of its allo-
cative efficiency. Unlike direct taxes, which affect incentives, e.g.,
changes in work effort, in willingness to bear risk, or in investment
and savings, and also unlike selective ad valorem taxes, which lead
to distortions in factor and commodity prices, the consumption-type
VAT can be shown to be relatively neutral in its allocative effects.
In principle, the VAT rate is the same for all activities. Therefore,
it would not create artificial incentives to use particular productive
inputs, production processes, or commodities.3
Finally, the concern, particularly in business circles, with the
alleged depressive effects of high, nominally progressive rates of in-
come taxation on investment, risk-taking, and growth has led to a
continuing interest in alternative revenue sources. In this regard, the
probable regressivity of the VAT, as a replacement for some part of
the personal or corporate income tax, may be viewed as a positive
attribute.
2. The history of the VAT is relatively brief. A variant was employed by
France between 1948 and 1953. The Shoup Tax Mission to Japan proposed the
VAT as a revenue source for prefectures in 1950, but this recommendation was
never adopted. Brazil, Greece, and Turkey have, at various times, employed the
VAT as a manufacturers' sales tax. The VAT was formally adopted as a replace-
ment for other forms of indirect taxation by the European Economic Com-
munity (Common Market) in 1963, and has recently been enacted by the final
remaining EEC members [Shoup, 1970, p. 250].
3. The only area in which the consumption-type VAT is not allocatively neu-
tral is in the allocation of time between work (and the consumption of pur-
chased, hence taxed, commodities) and leisure (an untaxed consumption com-
modity).The VAT-CiTSubstitution 5
1.2 DIFFERENTIAL INCIDENCE ANALYSIS
Thetheoretical origins of this study are embedded in the develop-
ment in public finance theory of differential incidence analysis. The
most important single insight of modern incidence theory is that the
effects of government policies can be assessed only with reference to
some base, i.e., the configuration of the economy (e.g., price and
output structure, factor and size distributions of income) under some
alternative public policy. In brief, it makes no sense to talk of the
"absolute" effects of any policy; itis only possible to identify
the differential effects of one policy as an alternative to another.
Thus, with the substitution of one tax for another, the economic
configuration under the replaced tax provides a basis or benchmark
for the analysis of the effects of the newly introduced tax.
Because the term "differential incidence" has become somewhat
ambiguous, having been applied to almost any examination of the
effects of alternative taxes, its meaning in the present context must
be explored and clarified. Most succinctly, its use here is synon-
omous with compensated tax(policy)substitution. In effect, a re-
duction in the rate of one tax is compensated for by the imposition
of another. Obviously, the meaning of "compensates" is not immed-
iately clear: a wide range of useful and valid interpretations is pos-
sible, depending on the objective of the particular analysis.
In its most simple sense compensation might be interpreted to re-
quire only equal monetary (nominal revenue) yield of two alternative
taxes. In its most elaborate sense compensation implies holding all
relevant economic magnitudes constant except one, and measuring
the effect of the tax change in the remaining dimension.
The issue of criteria for a compensating tax substitution is related,
but not identical, to the issue of the range of effects of the tax
substitution which are to be explicitly considered in the analysis.
Again, at the most simple extreme it could be assumed that every-
thing other than the nominal yields of the taxes being altered will re-
main constant, i.e., that the tax changes will have only direct effects
and that the system will not further respond to the changes in tax
variables. At a more complex level a comparative statics analysis
of the system in equilibrium under each tax configuration provides
one alternative, and a dynamic analysis of the response of the system
to the tax change provides another. Thus, parallel to the definition
of a compensating tax change is the identification of the effects
which must be compensated. A more sophisticated definition of
compensation requires a more elaborate representation of economic6 Substituting a Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
processesin relation to the fiscal environment. It is in this sense
that meaningful differential incidence analysis requires a general
equilibrium framework.
Our study represents only a first step in the process of applying
the insights of public finance theory to an analysis of concrete policy
choices. Formally, the analysis is of the input-output or flow of
funds variety, i.e., it does not attempt to take account of elastici-
ties of supply, demand, or substitution through which the economy
adjusts to fiscal change. Because of a number of restrictive assump-
tions which have been imposed by the c.omplexity of relevant ec-
onomic processes, the analysis is limited to an assessment of "first-
round," or analytically short-run responses to the indicated tax
change.4 Since the range of responses analyzed is restricted, e.g.,
wages, production coefficients, and final demands are assumed fixed,
a number of factors pertinent to a complete general equilibrium
assessment of a large-scale change in fiscal structure are not ex-
amined. Nevertheless, the range of responses is broad enough to re-
quire a more complex compensation criterion than equal monetary
yield.
A distinguishing feature of the analysis is its emphasis on the high-
ly disaggregated consequences of the policy actions examined. A
number of very different policies composed in part of the elements
studied here may be capable of producing basically similar aggre-
gate effects, although their consequences at more disaggregated levels
may be quite diverse. The analytic richness of alternative policies
resides precisely in this micro-level diversity, and differential micro-
consequences ultimately must constitute the basis for policy choice.
It should be clearly understood at the outset that this study con-
sists of an analysis of the underlying implications of this or that
potential change in the tax system, and not of a prediction of the
actual consequences were the particular policy to be enacted. This
analysis-prediction dichotomyisparticularlyimportant to the
comprehension and evaluation of the study. Many large-scale ec-
onometric models predict relatively accurately. However, policy
changes in general operate (exert their effects) at the margin and
only slowly over time. Even a highly accurate econometric model
may not be able to identify the marginal effects of a specific policy
change, particularly when these effects become fully apparent only
4. By "short-run" we do not mean to imply temporally short-term responses,
but rather a limitation on the extent of adaptive response by different elements
of the economy to the change in tax structure which can be examined. Thus,
"short-run" here is used in its analytical, microeconomic sense.
-.- .-The VAT-CITSubstiwtion 7
overlonger periods of time. The nonpredictive, analytic purpose of a
policy evaluation model, it is argued, justifies at least provisionally
many of the oversimplifications incorporated in its empirical im-
plementation. Thus, the objective of the analysis is not to predict
quantitative shifts or precise time-profiles of response (lag structures,
etc.) but to identify qualitative changes in "first-round" impacts,
e.g., in income distribution, relative growth of various industries, or
internationaltrade.Itshould be clearly understood that these
represent only intermediate-state tendencies, due to limitations on
our capacity to assess empirically the full range of ultimate responses
to a particular change in fiscal structure.
in the remainder of this introduction the emphasis is on the sub-
stance of the VAT-CIT substitution, while in later sections the two
levels of analysis are intermingled.
1.3CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VAT
Asindicated above, it has been commonly argued that a partial or
complete substitution of the VAT for the CIT would have favorable
effects for the level of investment, for the interindustry and cor-
porate-noncorporate distribution of investment, for allocative ef-
ficiency, and for the balance of payments. Nevertheless, its regressive
effects on income distribution are admitted, and they provide the
focus for opposition to a simple substitution of the VAT for the CIT
(National Economic Development Office; Smith]. However, both
the magnitude and timing of these effects will necessarily depend
upon the specific nature of the legislated tax changes and upon the
constellation of price changes in goods and factor markets resulting
from the tax substitution. Thus, discussions of the VAT must pro-
ceed in terms of anticipated consequences on prices and factor re-
turns of a specific VAT-CIT substitution.
The variants of the value-added tax we examine are all of the con-
sumption type,5 the one universally adopted by countries that have
enacted a VAT. The choice is further dictated by the administra-
tive convenience of this form, which is reflected in its adoption
abroad, and by desirable economic characteristics, particularly as
contrasted withthegross-product variant, which has received
extensive attention elsewhere [Aaron].
5.Ignoringgovernments, the tax base of a consumption-type VAT consists
only of private domestic consumption expenditure, in contrast to a base of
consumption plus net investment (national income or net national product) for
the income type, and consumption plus gross investment (gross national prod-
uct) for the gross-product type.8 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Theobvious, although not unique, technique for administering a
consumption-type VAT is the invoice method: each potential tax-
paying entity computes a gross tax liability on all sales, as invoiced
to purchasers, and then receives a credit for all VAT invoiced on its
own intermediate or investment purchases. Net tax due is then the
excess of the gross liability on sales over total credits for taxes paid
on purchases.6
Since the VAT is a destination tax, it would not be invoiced on ex-
port sales, but a full credit for previously invoiced (earlier stage) VAT
would be provided, resulting in a zero net rate of tax on exports. On
the other hand, imports would be fully subject to VAT as a border
tax. Investment purchases themselves would be wholly free of tax,
since the entire VAT on investment purchases would be creditable
against the gross VAT liability in computing actual tax due. A tax
liability would arise only as capital services were embodied in tax-
able consumption output. As will be discussed later, this procedure
is equivalent to instantaneous depreciation under an income tax.
Clearly, to exempt export or investment purchases completely,
any excess of credits over liabilities must result in a rebate to the
taxpayer. However, the value of the net credit would be reduced,
and nominally exempted purchases would be partially taxed, if the
credit were simply carried over to be applied against future VAT
liabilities.7
The treatment of government purchases under a VAT is in the
aggregate (national accounts) sense moot, since any VAT liability
invoiced on government purchases is simultaneously government
revenue and expenditures. However, under a multilevel govern-
ment system, with the VAT imposed at the national level, the
introduction of the VAT and the specific treatment of govern-
ment purchases may differentially affect the fiscal status of various
government units. Particularly in the context of substituting a fed-
eral VAT for both federal and state CITs, achievement of inter-
governmental neutrality will not be possible.
The equivalence of a value-added tax and its corresponding single-
stage tax (which in the case of the consumption-type VAT would
be the retail sales tax, RST), has been a subject of continuing debate
6. For a more detailed discussion of administration, with a consideration also
of VATs of the income and gross-product types, see Shoup [1970, pp. 257-261].
7. If provision were made only for a carryover to the future of net credits,
the effective tax would be the difference between the nominal credit and its
present value. This point is worth noting because it has commonly been ig-
nored, e.g., under the French carryover treatment of net credits arising from
high rates of investment undertaken by new or rapidly growing firms.The VAT-CiTSubstitution 9
[Lindholm,1970 and 1971; National Economic Development Office,
1971, Chapter 5, Annex 1; Shoup, 1972; Due, 1972]. Formally, the
two axe clearly equivalent. A consumption-type VAT and an RST in
principle apply to an identical base, private domestic consumption
expenditure. Under the usual competitive assumptions this would
imply corresponding economic effects, i.e., the degree of tax shifting
would be the same under both, with no effect on relative prices. It
has been argued, however, that since the VAT is a multiple stage
tax, there would be greater "slippage"8 in forward shifting of the
tax, although the logic which would lead to an expectation of sys-
tematic differences between the RST and consumption-type VAT
in tax shifting does not seem particularly compelling. With a credit
for earlier against later stage VAT liabilities, for example, differen-
tial shifting would imply that net-of-tax prices of exempted com-
modities (investment, export, and government purchases) would
decline if a VAT replaced an equivalent RST. On the other hand it
can be argued that since the VAT is in part paid considerably sooner
than the RST on the final output, the added financing charge would
cause forward shifting of somewhat more than the VAT, to an
extent not entirely offset by the gain to the government through
earlier receipts, given the higher cost of capital to private firms as
compared to interest rates paid by government. This tendency would
be enhanced to the extent that conventional markups might be
applied to costs inclusive of VAT.
Apart from this dispute over the economic equivalence of ap-
propriately designed value-added and retail sales taxes, the choice
between them reduces to the relative ease and effectiveness of ad-
ministration. For the retail sales tax it has been argued that collec-
tion is less costly since only the final-stage seller must be included
in the tax administration network. Offsetting this is the greater like-
lihood that some taxable sales will escape tax entirely. Thus, if for
administrative ease, small retail establishments are exempted from
the tax, their sales entirely escape an RST, while only the markup
of the retailer escapes under the VAT if the exemption takes the
form of filing no tax return. Similarly, tax evasion is more difficult
with a VAT. More generally, the consumption-type VAT, under the
invoice method, is argued to be self-enforcing. To obtain a credit for
VAT paid, a seller must report his VAT liability on sales, and the
invoiced credit claimed by a purchaser can be compared with the
VAT liability reported by the seller. Thus, with dual reporting a
8.I.e., lower price increases than would be observed if the change in tax
liability were fully translated into a change in price.10 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
minimalrate of random checks would be expected to be quite effec-
tive in identifying tax evasion.
A major advantage claimed for the VAT is its ability to distinguish
between business and nonbusiness purchasers. A significant com-
plaint against the RST and related single-stage, seller-administered
taxes is the difficulty of crediting purchasers. In extreme cases this
even extends to exports, when, e.g., wholesaler taxes are unable to
distinguish between domestic and foreign purchasers. The virtue
of the VAT is that both buyer and seller are taxpaying units; thus,
the tax charged at one stage can be rebated at another if a sale is
nontaxable. Under any sales-type tax only one stage is directly in-
volved in tax collection, and credits and rebates become difficult
if not impossible.
A common argument for the RST relates to the ease with which
"multiple rate" systems can be accommodated. Thus, the retail
sales taxes of many states exempt, or tax at lower rates, purchases
of such "necessities" as food, clothing, utilities, medical care and
drugs, etc., and it has been alleged that such practices would be more
difficult under a VAT. While it will be argued below that multi-
ple rates are undesirable in principle and are quite ineffective in
terms of their stated objectives, most commonly the mitigation of
regressivity, the provision of a VAT credit to the seller of an un
taxed commodity could as easily, and completely, exempt these
selected transactions from taxation as would exemption under an
RST.
Apart from the merits of the VAT versus the RST, it can be safely
suggested that at worst a VAT would be more easily administered
than an equally universal profits tax, if only because it requires no
inventory accounting and no estimate of depreciation.
1.4CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
VAT-CIT SUBSTITUTION
Ourfocus is on the first-round cost and price consequences of
varying degrees of replacement of the CIT by a consumption-type
VAT with the characteristics just described. The analysis is based
upon an input-output model representing the U.S. economy in
Itis assumed that factor incomes other than corporate
profits, interindustry input-output coefficients, and final demands
are initially unaffected by the tax substitution. it is in this sense
that the analysis is restricted to "first-round" consequences of the
9. The model is described more completely in Chapter 2.The VAT-CiTSubstitution11
changein tax structure. Adjustments of these variables will imply
further-round consequences of the tax substitution.
The first phase of the study is concerned with the effects of the
tax substitution on prices, by industry and by component of final
demand. Thus, the input-output model serves the function of transla-
ting changes in tax liabilities into changes in prices. Given the restric-
tive assumptions imposed, first-round price effects, strictly speaking,
represent "tax allocation" effects reached under common assump-
tions for allindustries, concerning the reflection of various tax
changes in pricing decisions.
It is assumed throughout that the VAT is fully shifted forward
and that VAT-exclusive prices are identical for all classes of pur-
chasers (consumption, investment, export, and government). The
assumption of an appropriately flexible, monetary policy isre-
quired to support the assumed patterns of VAT shifting. More
generally, under the assumption of profit-maximizing behavior on
the part of producers and traders, monetary and fiscal policies are
assumed to be compatible with maintaining the original (pre-VAT)
level of real income along with proportionate changes in all prices
and unchanged net-of-VAT demands for all commodities, with
effectively complete forward shifting. This is the classical price
theory argument for full shifting of a general ad valorem tax.
Correspondingly, the classical assumption regarding the CIT is
that in the short run the returns to capital (profits, corporate in-
come) are quasi-rents (the capital stock is fixed and the supply of
capital services is inelastic with respect to the rate of return or price,
as long as output price is greater than variable cost), and therefore
forward shifting should not occur. That is, the elimination of the
CIT should not affect output prices in the short run if the latter
are determined subject to the classical condition that marginal cost
equals marginal revenue.
However, in this case professional opinion is much more divided,
with empirically based assertions ranging from zero shifting [Gordon I
toshifting in excess of unity [Krzyzaniak and Musgrave]. In light of
this dispute a range of alternative shifting assumptions is employed
in the analysis, and the sensitivity of the consequences of the tax
substitution to the degree of forward CIT shifting is given particu-
lar attention. For purposes of translating tax changes into price
changes, CIT shifting is simply defined as the change in gross-of-tax
profit relative to the change in tax liability.
To justify short-run forward shifting of the CIT it is necessary to
introduce "nonclassical" theories of price determination: oligopolis-
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producerswho are subject to external constraints on collusive joint
maximizing decisions or who engage in entry-restricting pricing;
long-run "normal cost"and administered-pricing theories;etc.
However, whatever the underlying price-formation process, forward
shifting of the CIT implies that net profits, capital earnings, and rates
of return enter into price determination. If market pressures on net
earnings are not perfectly competitive, then CIT increases or the
benefits of CIT reductions will be shifted to consumers.
This relationship of price to net capital earnings in the case of
forward CIT shifting has two primary implications for the analysis
of the VAT-CIT substitution. First, it determines our treatment of
depreciation, which is included at replacement cost. If the returns to
capitalarequasi-rents,asclassicalprice theory indicates, then
changes in capital goods prices do not alter commodity prices in the
short run. However, if prices are influenced by net profits, then
changes in capital goods prices must be incorporated in commodity
pricing. This is achieved by including depreciation in intermediate
interindustry transactions rather than in the residual component of
industry value added.
Secondly, the relationship between net capital earnings and price
implied by forward CIT shifting provides a heuristic justification for
the assumption of full forward shifting of the VAT, even if non-
classical price formation is assumed. Thus, a failure to shift the VAT
completely would reflect imperfectly competitive market pressures
similar to those required for generating short-run CIT shifting. How-
ever, the "net rate of return" constraints will already have been in-
corporated through CIT shifting. It therefore appears redundant to
impose them a second time through an incomplete shifting of the
VAT, since the tax changes are assumed to be simultaneous.
Initial presubstitution rates of CIT were determined from aggre-
gate data by input-output sector, and are thus industry-specific.
The reduction in CIT rates is assumed to be proportionate to these
rates industry by industry. Because it was impossible at this level of
disaggregation to distinguish among state and federal CIT liabilities,
it was assumed that the proportionate reduction in effective CIT
rates applies to all corporate income taxes.
The reduction or elimination of the CIT has several consequences
for government. First, assuming that prices (and gross profits) are
unchanged, i.e., assuming that the benefits of the CIT reduction are
not shifted forward as lowered prices (exclusive of the newly im-
posed VAT), the government experiences only a primary CIT rev-
enue loss, equal to the change in tax rates multiplied by the pre-
tax-substitution levels of corporate income. But, if instead, the CITThe VAT-CiTSubstitution13
reductionis shifted forward, lowering prices, and if the CIT is not
completely eliminated, then with gross-of-tax profits reduced, the
CIT at the new, lower rates will be reduced even further than the
primary loss would indicate. This secondary revenue loss obviously
occurs only if the CIT is retained, since the maximum revenue loss,
primary and secondary combined, cannot exceed the revenue yield
prior to the tax substitution. Finally, the level of nominal govern-
ment expenditures will be reduced if, as a result of CIT reduction
and shifting, the (VAT-exclusive) prices of government purchases
decline.
An ultimately major effect of the tax substitution is not taken
into consideration in the present analysis: Unless the CIT is con-
sidered to be entirely shifted forward, or the effect of CIT reduction
is offset by monetary stringency and increased interest rates, in-
vestment demand will increase. Thus, if real disposable income, 'irid
with it the level of consumption demand, are initially maintained at a
constant level by maintaining an unchanged government budgetary
deficit or surplus, an increase in aggregate demand will occur, re-
sulting in an increase in real income or in the rate of inflation. A
change in the interest rate, if used to offset the effect of the CIT
reduction on the aggregate volume of investment, would in itself
involve a severe redistribution of incomes and differential effects
on prices. In effect, in what follows, the analysis reflects only ex-
treme short-run impacts which occur before investment has had time
to respond to the changed circumstances.
The VAT rate is determined at that level which will just compen-
sate for the three initial governmental impacts described above: the
primary CIT revenue loss, the secondary CIT revenue loss, and the
reduction in the cost of government purchases. Compensation is
thus defined in terms of an unchanged government surplus or deficit,
rather than in terms of an unchanged level of aggregate demand. This
VAT-yield criterion, which equates the net change in tax revenue to
the net change in government expenditure under the assumption of a
constant bill of final demand, incorporates price changes for govern-
ment resulting from CIT reduction and shifting. It can be argued that
this yield criterion is a politically and legislatively relevant condition,
given the way such legislation is usually thought of by those responsi-
ble for its formulation. It is consistent with short-run budgetary neu-
traiity in accordance with the restriction of the present analysis to
"first round" effects. It makes no attempt, however, to avoid a
net stimulative or sedative effect on the economy as a whole in the
medium or longer run; indeed the levels of VAT revenue specified
in this analysis as the equivalent of various levels of CIT reduction14 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
canbe expected under most circumstances to lead within a fairly
short period after the change to a substantial stimulus to the econ-
omy or to increased inflationary pressure.
Just as the required VAT revenue varies with the degree of CIT
reduction and shifting, so the VAT base also varies. The greater the
degree of the CIT shifting, the greater will be the decline in (VAT-
exclusive) prices of consumption goods, necessitating a higher VAT
rate.
Thus, the relationship between the VAT rate and the degree of
CIT reduction and shifting is somewhat complex. At one extreme, if
the CIT is not shifted, then (a) the prices of government-purchased
commodities are unchanged, (b) gross profits are not reduced and no
secondary CIT revenue loss is experienced, and (c) net-of-VAT con-
sumption expenditure is unaltered. Thus, the VAT rate is simply
determined by the primary CIT revenue loss relative to the pre-
substitution level of consumption expenditure. At another extreme,
if the CIT is completely eliminated, then the secondary CIT revenue
loss, which is due to the reduction in gross profits induced by shift-
ing the CIT, is necessarily zero. In between these extremes, as the de-
gree of shifting increases, required VAT revenue declines as the re-
sult of reduced government prices, while the VAT base declines as
a result of reductions in VAT-exclusive consumer prices. Whether
the VAT rate will rise or fall with an increase in the degree of shifting
of the CIT depends on whether required revenue declines more or
less rapidly than the VAT base. For intermediate degrees of CIT
reduction and shifting, the required VAT rate will vary systematic-
ally with primary and secondary CIT revenue loss and with changes
in government and consumer expenditures induced by CIT shifting.
Once the first-round price effects of the tax substitution have been
determined, itis possible to assess the probable later round con-
sequences for income distribution, investment, international trade
and the balance of payments, etc.
1.5CONSEQUENCES OF THE
VAT-CIT SUBSTITUTION
Thissection contains a brief summary of the substantive conse-
quences of the tax substitution for varying assumed degrees of CIT
reduction and shifting. Because, as indicated above, the degree of
forward CIT shifting determines the CIT revenue loss and the change
in government and consumer prices resulting from CIT reduction,
the CIT.compensating VAT rate depends crucially upon the as-
sumed degree of CIT shifting. Using the model described in Chapter
2, the estimated relationship between CIT reduction and shifting, onThe VA T-CIT Substitution15
theone hand, and the CIT-compensating VAT rate, on the other, are
outlined in Table 1—1. For relatively small reductions in CIT rates
the VAT rate rises with increases in shifting, simply because (1) the
secondary CIT revenue loss is greater than the savings in government
expenditures resulting from the decline in prices, i.e., as shifting rises,
the amount of VAT revenue needed to compensate also rises, while
(2) the VAT base necessarily declines. Thus, on the basis of our
model, if CIT rates are reduced across the board by 25 percent, the
VAT rate which will just hold the government surplus (deficit) con-
stant rises from 1.9 percent if CIT savings are not shifted to 2.9
percent if these savings are shifted forward completely in the form of
lower prices. However, if the relative reduction in the CIT is large,
then the secondary revenue loss due to the decline in gross profits
will be small, since the remaining CIT rate, applying to the now
lower pretax profits, will be relatively low, while government ex-
penditure savings resulting from price reductions may be quite large
relative to the net change in CIT revenue. If the government ex-
penditure reduction net of the secondary CIT revenue loss, relative
to the primary CIT revenue loss, is greater than the shifting-induced
decline in consumer expenditures, relative to their presubstitution
level, then the required VAT rate will decline with increased CIT
shifting. In fact, in the extreme case of complete CIT removal, for
which there is no secondary revenue loss (the new CIT rate is zero),
government expenditure reductions result in a decline in the VAT
rate from 7.7 percent in the absence of CIT shifting to 7.2 percent
if the benefits of CIT removal are fully translated into lower prices.
Since an increase in CIT shifting calls for an increase in the re-
quired VAT rate when the CIT reduction is small, and a decrease
when itis large, there must be, for some intermediate degree of
CIT reduction, a stationary point, at which a small increase or de-
crease in CIT shifting calls for neither an increase or decrease in




b Degree of CIT Reduction
25% 75% 100%
0.0 1.92% 5.76% 7.68%
0.4 2.19 5.91 7.50
1.0 2.91 6.19 7.22
Source: Table 3-1.
aThe proportion ofany reduction in CIT liabilities which accrues to purchasers
in the form of lower prices.
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therequired VAT rate. At this level of CIT reduction, the relative
change in VAT revenue required to offset the reduction must equal
the relative change in the VAT base resulting from increased shifting,
implying a VAT rate invariant to the degree of shifting. In our
model, this equality is found at a relative CIT reduction of between
85 and 90 percent, for which the VAT.rate is constant at about 6.8
percent, regardless of CIT shifting.
Invariance of the VAT rate is significant because the actual degree
of CIT shifting is unknown and subject to dispute. More generally,
the degree of forward shifting may not be fixed for all time, but may
rather be a symptom of underlying conditions of demand, supply, and
competition prevailing at the time of the tax change. In this context
of uncertainty, if great weight is placed upon avoidance of unan-
ticipated government surpluses or deficits, then on the basis of our
model the risk-adverting policy would be to undertake a major re-
duction in the CIT, since the budgetary surplus would then be
virtually unaffected by the degree of CIT shifting. Of course, the
range of conceivable variability in the degree of shifting may itself
be a function of the degree of CIT reduction. In that case, a VAT
rate unaffected by CIT shifting may be purchased at the price of
greater unpredictability concerning the degree of shifting [NEDO,
pp. 43-44].
The sensitivity of the tax-substitution-induced price changes to
the assumed degree of CIT shifting determines the relationship be-
tween the degree of CIT shifting and the compensatory VAT rate.
Again, zero shifting of the CIT provides an extreme; in this case,
prices exclusive of VAT are unaltered by the tax substitution, while
VAT-inclusive prices rise by the VAT rate. With any degree of
positive forward shifting of the CIT, however, VAT-exclusive prices
(investment, exports, and government) decline, and the net rate of
increase in VAT-inclusive consumption prices is less than the VAT
rate. Thus, in our model, if the CIT is not shifted, repeal of the CIT
requires a compensatory VAT rate of 7.68 percent, and consump-
tion prices rise just by this percentage. But with full forward CIT
shifting, the required VAT rate is 7.22 percent, while consumption
prices increase by only 1.68 percent. In the first case (no shifting),
VAT-exempt prices are unaffected. In the second case (full shifting),
these prices decline, in the extreme by 5.45 percent (private fixed
investment). The size of consumption price increases and VAT.
exempt price decreases are of course smaller if the CIT is only
partially removed, but increases in the degree of shifting invariably
increase the magnitude of VAT-exclusive price declines and reduceThe VA T-CIT Substitution17
themagnitude of VAT-inclusive price increases, as indicated in
Table 1-2.
At the first-round stage all of the consequences of the VAT-CIT
substitution flow from alterations in tax liabilities and, corrspond-
ingly, in prices. The most important dimensions in which these con-
sequences are explored are income distribution, investment, and
international trade.
1.5.1Consequences for Income Distribution
Inunrelieved form the change from the CIT to the VAT is in-
variably regressive. Consider specifically the case of complete repeal
of the CIT. With zero CIT shifting consumption prices rise by the
VAT rate while after-tax corporate profits increase by the full
amount of the former CIT revenue (equal to the revenue yield of the
newly imposed VAT). If the increases in consumption expenditures
are allocated to households on the basis of the level and composi-
tion of these expenditures and the increases in profits are allocated
on the basis of wealth, then changes in taxliabilityrelative to in-
come decline with income class: from a net increase in liability of
6 percent at incomes between $5,000 and $7,500 to a net decrease
of 7 percent at incomes above $15,000.
Table1—2.Price Indices for Consumption and Nonresidential Fixed Invest-
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Ifthe CIT reduction is fully shifted forward in the form of lower
prices, the rest of the world reaps a net benefit of $2.5 billion as a
result of export price reductions. Similarly, the prices of capital
goods decline, due to the shifted reduction in the CIT. Only VAT-
inclusive consumption prices rise, although to a lower degree than in
the case of zero CIT shifting. After-tax profits under the full-shifting
assumption are unaffected by the tax substitution. If the reduction
in prices of investment goods is distributed to households on the
basis of wealth holdings, and if consumption price increases are dis-
tributed as indicated in the preceding paragraph, it is again possible
using our model to estimate the impact of the change in tax structure
on the distribution of income. The domestic burden of the price
increases, although positive in the aggregate, declines by income class
from about 2 percent at incomes between $5000 and $7500 to
minus 0.2 percent at incomes above $15,000.
Perhaps the most interesting finding concerning income distribu-
tionisthat multiple-rate and VAT-exemption schemes do not
mitigate the underlying regressivity of the VAT. To maximize the
progressivity of a multiple-rate VAT in our model, all consumption
commodities exhibiting income elasticities less than unity were
assumed to be completely exempt from the VAT.'0 We thus carried
to an extreme the common practice of exempting "necessities" from
state retail sales taxes, in order to reduce the regressivity of that
particular ad valorem levy.
This exemption scheme failed in significantly reducing the re-
gressivity of the VAT-CIT substitution. For example, if the CIT
is eliminated, the exemption of commodities in inelastic demand in
our model reduces the Gini coefficient (index of inequality) only
from 0.397 to 0.394 if the CIT is not shifted, and from 0.380 to
0.377 if the CIT reduction is fully shifted, the initial figure in each
of these comparisons being to the postsubstitution value of the Gini
coefficient in the absence of an exemption. These increases in
equality compare to a pre-tax-substitution Gini coefficient of 0.374,
indicating that the exemption partially reduces the regressive effect
of the VAT-CIT substitution, especially if the CIT is fully shifted.
Moreover, this marginal mitigation of regressivity is purchased at
the price of a significant increase in the basic VAT rate, from about
7 percent to over 15 percent for those commodities still subject to
VAT. This extreme ratedifferential,zero for some classes of
10. Administratively, sellers would not invoice VAT on final sales of these
commodities, but would receive full credit for VAT on intermediate purchases,
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commoditiesversus 15 percent for others, could be expected to
produce significant ailocative distortions as households change their
consumption patterns, by substituting exempt for taxable com-
modities, in an attempt to minimize tax liabilities.
In a more realistic context, in which fewer commodities were
subject to exemption, this rate differential could be significantly
reduced but only at the price of an even less effective amelioration of
regressivity.In addition, the allocative distortions that occur in
response to differential rates of taxation would remain; thus, the
allocative neutrality of the VAT, its most significant positive attri-
bute, would be lost.Finally, the European experience indicates
quite clearly that the private and governmental costs of tax ad-
ministration are greatly increased by the incorporation of dual and
multiple VAT rates [NEDO, p. 5}.
Thus, dual rates can be objected to on a number of counts, and
use of such schemes has little mitigating effect on the basis regres-
sivity of the tax substitution. However, this finding does not provide
a substantial argument against the VAT-CIT substitution on dis-
tributional grounds. First, the position could be taken that the U.S.
tax structure would be improved by the regressivity implied by a
VAT-CIT substitution. The overall progressivity-regressivity of the
tax system as a whole would be only marginally influenced in any
event. Secondly, other means could be found to compensate for the
regressivity of the VAT-CIT substitution while retaining the basic
allocative neutrality of the VAT. For example, systems of rebatable
credits against personal income tax liabilities have often been pro-
posed in the context of otherwise regressive ad valorem taxes. Thus,
the VAT could be levied at a higher rate than estimated to be re-
quired here to compensate for the CIT, with a credit against the
income tax permitted for VAT imputed on a basic level of per
capita consumption. The additional revenue requirements resulting
from income tax losses could be reduced if the credit were of the
"vanishing" variety, i.e., were itself included as a component of tax-
able income and subjected to tax. Alternatively, but somewhat more
radically, the VAT itself could be replaced by a direct progressive
expenditures tax of the type proposed by Kaldor. This tax would
preserve the allocative neutrality and many of the other desirable
characteristics of the VAT that relate to investment and trade.
In a system already employing an income tax, administration of a
progressive expenditures tax would only require in addition that
taxpayers consistently adjust the realized income as now reported
by the flows into and out of investment, and by gifts and bequests
made or received.20 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
1.5.2 :nvestment Consequences
Weassessed the investment effects of the VAT-CIT substitution on
the basis of the liquidity theory of investment elaborated by Kuh,
Meyer, and Glauber. Following Brittain, Lintner, and Dobrovoisky,
we assumed that dividends are determined by nominal profits. In-
vestment is then a function of real cash flow net of dividends and
corporate profits taxes. If it is assumed that the CIT is not shifted,
its repeal will not alter the prices of capital goods. Profits (net of
tax) would then increase in our model by $42.68 billion, equal
to total CIT liabilities, which would imply an increase of $18.43
billion in dividends. The remainder, a $24.25 billion increase in real
net cash flow, would result in a curnukitive increase in gross invest-
ment of $32.05 billion." In the short run the Meyer-Glauber elas-
ticities indicate that gross investment in plant and equipment would
increase by 5.3 percent, or $5.3 billion. In this case, since capital
goods prices are unaffected by the tax change the investment stim-
ulus operates only in the incorporated sector.
With elimination and full forward shifting of the CIT, nominal net
cash flows are unaffected by the tax substitution. However, the
shifted CIT reduction has the effect of reducing capital goods prices
by more than 5 percent. Thus, real net cash flows are necessarily
increased, by $4.24 billion. The cumulative increase in gross in-
vestment stimulated by this price reduction is projected to be $8.98
billion, with a short-run. increase of 1.5 percent or $1.5 billion.
In this case the stimulus operates on the investment activity of both
the incorporated and the unincorporated sectors since the price
reductions benefit all investment activity. Of the $8.98 billion in-
crease in cumulative gross investment, the unincorporated sector
would account for $3.37 billion and the incorporated sector for
$5.61 billion.
Thus, under either CIT shifting assumption the replacement of the
CIT by the VAT might significantly stimulate aggregate investment
demand. In addition, the composition of investment demand would
be significantly altered in favor of the corporate sector if the CIT
were not shifted. It must be pointed out, however, that in the input-
output model itself, the assumption has been adhered to that no
change occurs in the level or composition of real final demand. The
above estimates of increases in investment resulting from the substi-
tution are "second round" effects not included in the model. Since
increases ineffective (VAT-inclusive) consumption prices might
11. This amount represents the undiscounted sum of all future increases in
investment resulting from an increased real cash flow in the current period.The VA T-C/TSubstiwtion 21
reducereal consumer demand, it could be expected that the invest-
ment stimulus would operate in more than one way. Investment
could be shifted toward sectors supplying disproportionately large
components of final demand that are exempt from the VAT and for
which prices may have declined. Alternatively, the process of "cap-
ital deepening" (greater capital intensity of production), rather than
"capital widening" (growth in productive capacity) could accelerate
in response to a reduction in the cost of capital relative to wages.
1.5.3International Trade Effects
Ourcontention is that the international trade consequences of the
VAT-CIT substitution have often been misunderstood and confused.
On the realistic assumption that the VAT is fully shifted forward,
any balance-of-trade effects of the change in tax must
result from the reduction or elimination of the CIT, not from the
imposition of the VAT itself. In general, the VAT has no effect on
the terms of trade. As a destination-based tax the VAT will have
trade effects only ifitis substituted for an origin-based tax, the
reduction of which is shifted forward in lower prices of exports
and of import-competing goods. Thus, if the CIT is not shifted the
terms of trade are unaltered. Prices of imports and of import-com-
peting commodities (if subject to the VAT) rise by equivalent
proportions (the VAT rate), while VAT-exclusive export prices are
unaltered. Thus, zero shifting of the CIT would imply an unchanged
balance of trade.
If the CIT reduction is shifted in the form of lower VAT-exclusive
prices, then its replacement by a VAT will serve (at least in the short
run) to stimulate exports and reduce imports. If the CIT is com-
pletely eliminated, the improvement in the balance of trade is esti-
mated in our model to be between $2.7 billion and $4.7 billion,
depending on the and import elasticities employed. To place
'these estimates in perspective, the complete removal of a forward-
shifted CIT is demonstrated to be equivalent to an effective de-
valuation of about 5 percent. Since such a devaluation is a perfectly
conceivable alternative to the VAT-CIT substitution, and has in fact
been effected between 197]. and 1973, balance-of-trade conse-
quences provide no substantial argument in favor of the tax substi-
tution. This is particularly true since one quite conceivable out-
come of the tax substitution is an unchanged balance of trade (if the
CIT is not shifted).
However, while the effect of VAT-CIT substitution on the balance
of trade under the most favorable assumptions would be equivalent
to a 5 percent devaluation, the effect on international capital flows22 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
mightbe quite different. Depending on the degree to which elimina-
tion of an unshifted CIT increased after-tax corporate profits and
rates of return, significant capital inflows might be predicted, which
might well reduce the deficit in the balance of payments. In brief,
a devaluation would operate primarily on the trade account, while
the tax substitution might operate either on the trade account (if
the CIT is shifted), on the capital account (if the CIT is not shifted),
or on both trade and capital accounts (intermediate degrees of CIT
shifting). Unfortunately, it has not been possible within the con-
fines of this study to assess quantitatively the potential implications
of the tax substitution for international capital flows.
As a final note on trade consequences, it should be pointed out
that the elimination of a shifted CIT and a 5 percent devaluation are
equivalent only in t3rms of the net change in the balance of trade.
Ingeneral,the devaluation apparently operates more strongly
through increases in exports than through the substitution of import-
competing goods for imports, while the reverse would be true under
the tax substitution with CIT shifting.12 However, changes in real
export and import flows would be quite similar under either of these
policies.
1.5.4Regional Effects
InChapter 7, particular attention is devoted to the differential
regional consequences of the tax substitution, especially its implica-
tions for the relatively low-income South. It is shown that, de-
pending on the degree of CIT shifting (complete versus zero), repeal
of the CIT would increase net southern tax liabilities by between
0.7 and 2.1 percent of disposable personal income in that region. In
contrast, the rest of the country, with per capita incomes one-third
greater than in the South, would experience a 0.7 percent reduction
in tax liabilities relative to income if the CIT were not shifted, and
only a 0.3 percent increase if the CIT were fully shifted.
On a regional basis, the tax-substitution-induced investment ex-
pansion is found to be significantly nonneutral. To project the
probable regional investment increases the ad hoc assumption was
employed that a region's share of any industry's investment ex-
pansion would be equal to its share of base (actual 1969) investment
in that industry. Applying the model to a selected group of manu-
facturing industries for which regional investment statistics were
12. This statement will be true if the relative price elasticity of exports (U.S.
export prices to world prices) is greater than the relative price elasticity of im-
ports (domestic prices of import-competing goods to world prices).
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availableand assuming complete CIT repeal, it was found that zero
CIT shifting would generate a 10 percent increase in investment na-
tionally; by region, the investment expansion would range between
7.5 percent in the West South Central to 12.5 percent in New
England. The South as a whole would experience an increase of 9.3
percent, versus 10.3 percent for the rest of the nation. In the case
of full CIT shifting the national expansion of 1.9 percent would
decompose into a regional range of from 1.5 percent (West South
Central) to 2.2 percent (New England), with an aggregate Southern
expansion of 1.7 percent in contrast to an expansion of 2.0 for the
rest of the nation. Thus, the South would experience a marginally
lower investment stimulus than the rest of the United States, pri-
marily because of differences in the South's industrial composi-
tion.
In terms of changes in international trade flows, the South would
benefit most from the potential stimulus to import-competing in-
dustries of a shifted CIT reduction, but would be only marginally
affected by any export expansion. Thus, if the CIT is shifted, the
stimulus to income and output in the South flowing from the VAT.
CIT substitution might be quite great.
1.5.5Other Substitution Effects
Virtuallyno attention has been given to intergovernmental fiscal
effects of a VAT-CIT substitution. In the discussion of these effects
it is usually pointed out that, notwithstanding the large direct labor
component in expenditures by state and local governments, these
jurisdictions would benefit significantly from complete elimination
of the federal CIT, if this were shifted forward in the form of lower
prices of government-purchased goods and services. However, if
federal repeal caused states simultaneously to repeal their own cor-
porate income taxes, as might be expected, then state-local govern-
ments, as a group, would suffer a significant net decline in budget
surpluses regardless of the degree of CIT shifting.'3 This adverse
change in budgetary status would be aggravated if these govern-
ments were not effectively exempted from the VAT (via either a
13. In section 1.4, we pointed out that since we could not separate federal
and state CIT liabilities at the individual industry level, we were forced to
assume that all CITs would be proportionately reduced. However, as discussed
later, the net burden of a state CIT is significantly reduced by the existence of a
federal CIT, since state CIT liabilities can be deducted in computing the base for
the federal CIT. This advantage would be lost if the federal CIT were greatly
reduced or repealed. Thus, it is not unlikely that states would in fact follow the
federal suit in CIT reduction. Also, elimination of the federal CIT could sig-
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creditor exemption from invoicing). Thus, if a federal VAT were
substituted for the state-federal CIT, explicit provision for sharing
of federal revenues with affected state-local governments would be
necessary if the tax substitution were not adversely to affect the
fiscal condition of individual jurisdictions. Whether such compensa-
tory federal action would in fact be desirable and, if so, how such a
distribution of federal revenues should be designed remain open
questions.
An assumption of the analysis is that nominal factor incomes
other than corporate profits are unaffected by the tax substitution.
However, consumer prices (inclusive of VAT) are found to increase
under all CIT shifting and reduction assumptions, implying declines
in real wages. To assess the differential short-run pressures for
further-round price and output adjustments in different industries,
wage adjustments required to restore pre-tax-substitution levels of
real wages are compared by industry with the decline in CIT liabili-
ties, under the assumption of repeal and zero shifting of the CIT.
Not surprisingly,itis found that the CIT savings greatly exceed
potential short-run labor cost increases in relatively capital-intensive,
highly incorporated industries.Conversely, labor-intensive, unin-
corporated industries could experience aggregate increases in wage
bills greatly in excess of CIT savings.
Much popular concern has focused on the potential interindustry
redistribution of tax burdens implicit in a VAT-CIT substitution. To
provide some evidence on this score the principal assumption of the
study, that the VAT is fully shifted forward in higher prices, is
dropped. It is demonstrated that, in the short run, if neither the CIT
nor the VAT were shifted, and if VAT-exclusive prices to all pur-
chasers were equalized,'4 then highly incorporated and rapid growth
(high-investment) industries would experience significant increases in
net profits, while after-tax profits would decline for relatively unin-
corporated, low-growth industries.'5
The strongest argument for the VAT-CIT substitutionis the
positive effect it would have on the overall allocative efficiency of
the United States economy. This increase in efficiency would follow
from improvements in production (in particular from a reallocation
14. Retaining the assumption of equal VAT-exclusive prices for all pur-
chasers implies that introduction of an unshifted VAT will reduce effective
prices on investment, export, and government sales. Thus, the change in after-
tax profits need not equal the net change in government tax receipts.
15. By "highly incorporated industries," we mean those industries in which
a large share of value added is accounted for by incorporated enterprises, and
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ofcapital from the noncorporate to the corporate sector), from
reallocation of consumption, and from probable increases in the rate
of capital accumulation.
As has been indicated throughout, the consequences of the VAT-
CIT substitution discussed here represent estimates only of the re-
suits of first-round, short-run responses to this change in tax struc-
ture, projected under a highly restrictive and confining set of assump-
tions. However, ultimate consequences of the substitution will only
flow from the more pervasive responses of households and pro-
ducers, not to mention fiscal and monetary authorities, to these
initial effects. This in itself is sufficient justification for the analysis;
it at least provides a basis for qualitative estimates of the probable
ultimate effects on important economic magnitudes and of further
policy adjustments which would be necessary or desirable.
In conclusion, it would appear that the only unique argument
in favor of the VAT-CIT substitution is the probable improvement in
allocative efficiency which such a movement toward a more neutral
system of taxation would induce. Redistributive effects certainly
do not provide a basis for advocating this substitution, and puta-
tive investment andinternational tradeeffects could be more con-
fidently achieved by other means.